A technical and forensic audit conducted by the Auditor-General has uncovered several irregularities in service delivery by the former leadership of the National Service Authority (NSS).
According to the findings, the former Deputy Executive Director of the National Service Authority (NSA), Gifty Oware-Aboagye, was enrolled as a national service person while already serving as a full-time salaried public officer.
Also, the leadership made irregular payments totalling GH¢1.01 billion to National Service Personnel (NSPs) who received allowances beyond the legally mandated 12-month service period.
Below are key findings and recommendations by the Auditor-General
1. Absence of Key Project Documentation – NSA procured and implemented the CSMP and Metric App without a business case, business requirements document (BRD), or project plan, undermining governance and exposing the projects to cost overruns, scope creep, and misaligned objectives.
Recommendation: Retrospectively compile missing documentation and institutionalize ICT project governance frameworks.
2. Non-Utilization of Payroll Module – Despite a functional payroll feature in CSMP, management bypassed it, relying on manual processes that weakened audit trails, increased risks of ghost names, and wasted the system investment.
Recommendation: Transfer payroll management to the Controller & Accountant-General’s Department.
3. Lack of Segregation of Duties – NSA staff responsible for enrolment and postings also managed payroll preparation and approvals, violating internal control principles and creating opportunities for fraud and ghost names.
Recommendation: Enforce segregation by assigning payroll to CAGD and separating enrolment/validation roles.
4. Excessive Protocol & Manual Override Postings – Between 2018 and 2024, 78% of postings (733,139 out of 935,375) bypassed system rules through overrides, undermining transparency and allowing ghost enrolments.
Recommendation: Restrict overrides to exceptional cases, enforce dual approvals, and configure CSMP alerts.
5. Irregular Manual Uploads – Over 842,000 (65%) of enrollments were manually uploaded by NSA staff and developers, outside prescribed channels, compromising enrollment integrity and exposing payroll to manipulation.
Recommendation: Cease manual uploads, enforce official channels only, and restrict developer roles.
6. Unaccounted Deductions – Payroll analysis revealed 39,683 personnel received zero or negative allowances, with deductions totaling GH¢28.4 million unaccounted for, suggesting diversion or manipulation of funds.
Recommendation: Align future deductions with BoG rules, recover all irregular deductions, and surcharge culpable officers.
7. Payments Beyond 13 Months – A total of 120,777 personnel received allowances exceeding the 13-month statutory maximum, costing GH¢1.017 billion, due to systemic override of payroll restrictions.
Recommendation: Recover over payments, enforce system restrictions, and surcharge culpable officers.
8. Payments to Former Director-General – Mr. Osei Assibey Antwi, a former NSA Director-General, irregularly received GH¢8.26 million under a volunteer number, equivalent to allowances for over 721 personnel, with no supporting documentation.
Recommendation: Block accounts, and tighten controls, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
9. Payments to Internal Staff – NSA officials, Jacob Yawson and Gaisie Abraham Bismark, were paid GH¢20.2 million through vendor accounts, raising conflict of interest and misappropriation concerns. Until his interdiction in May 2019, Mr. Jacob Yawson was the MIS Officer in the NSS Office in Tamale from January 2022, responsible for daily IT issues, verification and validation of NSS personnel in the region, whilst Mr. Abraham Gaisie was Head of Deployment, responsible for statistics of postings and posting of NSS staff between April 2019 and April 2025. He oversees upload and facilitates the upload of class lists and validate the lists before submitted to management.
Recommendation: Provide justification, submit contracts/invoices, or recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
10. Unsupported Payments to NASPA – GH¢9.28 million was disbursed to the National Service Personnel Association (NASPA) without agreements, accountability (evidence of proper acquittals), or board approval, breaching financial regulations.
Recommendation: Provide supporting documents or recover amounts; discontinue such transfers and surcharge culpable officers.
11. Unsupported Vendor Payments (Marketplace) – GH¢301.6 million was paid to 32 vendors without contracts, invoices, or delivery evidence, including GH¢169 million to Direct Savings & Loans, raising procurement and collusion risks.
Recommendation: Submit invoices and delivery records or recover sums and surcharge culpable officers.
12. Ineligible Age Enrollments – GH¢1.97 million was paid to personnel under 18, above 60, or with invalid ages (negative or up to 1,027 years), reflecting gross enrollment validation failures.
Recommendation: Configure CSMP to reject invalid ages, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
13. Payments Without Validation – GH¢988.6 million was paid to personnel without biometric or monthly attendance validation, contrary to NSA controls, enabling widespread payroll fraud.
Recommendation: Suspend unvalidated payments, sanction officers, enforce validation with CAGD payroll integration, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
13. Deputy Executive Director on NSP Payroll – Ms. Gifty Oware-Aboagye, a salaried Deputy Executive Director, was simultaneously enrolled as service personnel along with 4,556 others, irregularly costing GH¢899,350.
Recommendation: Block future enrolment of officers on Government payroll, sanction responsible staff, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
14. Volunteers at Subvented Agencies – 2,850 volunteers were improperly deployed to subvented agencies, against NSA guidelines, receiving GH¢11.3 million without authorization.
Recommendation: Suspend irregular payments, enforce posting rules, improve regional monitoring, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
15. Unverifiable Payments to NSA Volunteers – 6,460 volunteers at NSA offices/ projects were paid GH¢38,871,987.00 without verifiable records.
Recommendation: Compile detailed nominal rolls and enforce monthly validations.
16. Duplicate NSS Numbers & Multiple Ezwich USNs – Manipulations linked to duplicate NSS numbers caused losses of GH¢149,960,667.35.
Recommendation: Reconcile enrolments, block duplicate USNs, and enforce single ID rules.
17. Payments to NSPs via GhanaPay Exceeding 13 Months – The audit identified that National Service Personnel (NSPs) received payments via GhanaPay exceeding the statutory 13-month maximum, with some spanning multiple years. This irregularity led to an excess payment of GH¢144,608.43.
Recommendation: Recover all overpayments, surcharge culpable officers, enforce system-level restrictions to prevent payments beyond 13 months, and strengthen payroll validation controls
18. Payments Without Biometric or Monthly Validation via GhanaPay – A total of 636 allowance payment transactions via GhanaPay amounting to GH¢455,072.52 were made without biometric or monthly attendance validations, violating the National Service Act guidelines. Such weaknesses heighten the risk of ghost names and payroll fraud.
Recommendation: Suspend unvalidated payments, recover wrongful disbursements, sanction and surcharge responsible officers, and integrate CSMP validations with CAGD payroll systems.
19. Unsupported Payments to Vendors (MarketPlace) via GhanaPay – Payments totaling GH¢334,610.11 were made to Marketplace vendors via GhanaPay without contracts, invoices, or evidence of services rendered. These lacked Board approval and accountability, contravening the PFM Act.
Recommendation: NSA should provide contracts, invoices, and proof of delivery; otherwise, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
20. Deductions via GhanaPay Not Accounted For – Eighteen (18) NSPs had their allowances reduced to zero, resulting in GH¢141,682.86 in unexplained deductions via GhanaPay. This suggests diversion of funds to third parties within payroll processes.
Recommendation: Align payroll rules with BoG’s 60/40 emolument guideline, and implement exception reporting to flag zero or negative payments, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
21. Payments to NSPs Not Found in CSMP Database – The audit revealed that 710 NSPs, not found in the CSMP database, received GH¢7,508,592.92 through GhanaPay and Ezwich platforms. Some NSS numbers reflected future years, indicating fabrication (e.g., NSSGKN9695026, NSSGKN9695027, NSSGCC5212028, NSSGCC5212031, and NSSGST6975432).
Recommendation: Suspend all unverified payments, recover wrongful disbursements, sanction and surcharge culpable officers, and integrate CSMP biometric validation with CAGD payroll platform.
22. Payments to Volunteers Not Accounted For via GhanaPay – A total of 269 volunteers were paid GH¢1,232,673.18 through GhanaPay without verifiable nominal rolls, attendance records, or proper oversight.
Recommendation: Compile digitized nominal rolls, enforce monthly attendance validations, strengthen monitoring of volunteer payments, recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
23. Unapproved Transfers of E-Cash to Fiat – NSA transferred GH¢152,467,100 from e-cash to fiat without Ministry of Finance approval or supporting documentation, of which GH¢137,467,100 occurred in 2024. This raises risks of misappropriation and breaches of the PFM Act.
Recommendation: Provide MoF approvals, submit complete supporting documentation, or recover funds and surcharge culpable officers.
24. Irregularities in Service Extension Project – A GH¢55 million allocation for a Service Extension Project initially intended for volunteers to augment teaching of ICT and STEM in deprived and hard-to-reach communities in Ghana,” for 6 months, and later changed to farming activities at Kumawu for 20,000 personnel, was misapplied. No evidence of recruitment was found, and GH¢34 million was diverted to vehicles and irrigation systems. Only approximately 4,000 of the 200,000 acres targeted were cultivated.
Recommendation: Submit proof of recruitment, payroll validation, contracts, and project status reports, recover unsupported amounts and surcharge culpable officers.
25. Control Weaknesses in Volunteer Management – Irregular volunteer identification led to payments of GH¢35,012,946.34 that cannot be confirmed. Volunteers used NSS numbers, un-serialized IDs, regional codes, or project names as identifiers; some had no IDs at all.
Recommendation: Standardize volunteer IDs, enforce CSMP enrolment controls for Volunteers, require monthly attendance reports, and reconcile all records against deployment data.
26. Weak PIN Assignment and Validation Controls – The CSMP allowed premature NSS number generation and PIN reactivation abuses, leading to payments of GH¢310,726,892.76 to personnel with inactive PINs, duplicate numbers, or without validation.
Recommendation: Restrict NSS number generation to fully verified personnel, disable duplicate PIN reactivations, reconcile inactive PIN records, and mandate Ghana Card verification before enrolment and generation of PINs